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BEGIn TRAnSCRIPT:
SUSANNA BIRDSONG: Thank you so much for being here. My 
name is Susanna Birdsong and I am the Symposium Editor of the labor 
and employment law Forum. I would first like to thank our co-hosts 
for this event, the Women and the Law Program and the Women’s Law 
Association. I would especially like to thank Angie McCarthy for all of 
her hard work in helping us put this event together. 
CATHY VENTRELL-MONSEES: Good afternoon and welcome 
to the Washington College of Law. As I am a Federal Government 
Employee, please note that my appearance today is of a personal, rather 
than a professional nature.  Therefore any views expressed are my own, 
and are not the views of the Federal Government.
Today we are going to talk about a very hot issue—the largest civil 
rights class action ever filed. So let us talk a little bit about Betty Dukes 
and a group of women who decided to take on the behemoth Wal-Mart.1 




1.  Kenneth Jost, Class action lawsuits: Will the supreme Court approve the Wal-
mart Case?, 19 cQ reseArcher No. 19, May 13, 2011, (describing Betty Dukes slow and 
incremental progress from part-time cashier to greater of the course of seventeen years and 
how it relates to the experiences of many women working at Wal-Mart).
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raised two straight-forward claims.2 Their first claim was that Wal-Mart 
paid women workers less than male workers in comparable positions, 
despite the women having superior performance and seniority.The 
second [claim was] that Wal-Mart promoted men more frequently than 
. . . women [who were equally or better qualified]. 
The class was defined in a 2003 Motion for Class Certification as, “All 
women employed at Wal-Mart from December 26, 1998 to the present 
who had been subjected to Wal-Mart’s pay and promotion policies and 
practices.”3 This sounds fairly simple but this is a case of staggering 
proportions, as the class of women workers may total over 1.5 million. 
4Wal-Mart,5 as I said before, is the largest employer in the world, 
with over one million employees.6 So the class sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief to compel Wal-Mart to stop its current policies and 
practices and to prevent future discrimination, in addition to back pay 
and punitive damages. The class itself waved any right to compensatory 
damages. 
Now, the average back pay claim for the women who are hourly 
workers [and] managers would total about $11,000 per person.  [Now, 
c]ompare that to Wal-mart’s . . . assets [whick total over $170 billion.
So, it was said yesterday in court that this case is kind of a “David 
versus Goliath” story.7 It is actually better said as a “Betty versus Goliath” 
story. Wal-Mart has actually characterized the case in the Class’s attempt 
to get certification as being “historic in nature”—that assertion is true. 






2. see Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 131 U.S. 2541, 2563 (2011) (holding that evidence 
presented by members of class did not rise to the level of significant proof that the company 
acted under a general policy of discrimination).
3. dukes v. Wal-mart stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 187 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding 
that female employees of the Walmart retail store chain did not satisfy numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements, which are required to certify as a 
class under Title VII).
4. see generally, Jost, supra note 1 (discussing Wal-mart’s contention that 1.5 
million women possess too many differences to satisfy the class action requirements of 
“commonality” and “typicality”).
5. 222 F.R.D. at 141 . 
6. Global 500: top Companies Biggest employers, CNN Money (July 23, 2012), 
available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/performers/
companies/biggest/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
7. see id. (listing Wal-Mart as the largest global employer).
8. see Martha Burk, dukes v. Wal-mart One Year  later: Where do Women stand?, 
WAshington Post (June 17, 2012), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/martha-
burk/post_3504_b_1601449.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (noting that the class action 
against Wal-Mart is the largest class action in United States’ history, with more than 1.5 
million plaintiffs).
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for class certification.”9 In response, the district court noted that “Title 
VII does not exempt large employers.”10 
So in support of the motion for their class certification filing, the 
plaintiffs presented statistical evidence at a regional level for the Wal-
Mart stores in their paid promotions and practices.11 They presented 
declarations from 120 class members who testified to the lack of 
uniformity of the pay and promotion policies and practices and to the 
pervasive sexist stereotyping from the Wal-Mart corporate culture. And 
the plaintiffs’ social science expert testified that Wal-Mart’s subjective 
practices were vulnerable to sexual stereotyping.12 
In opposition, Wal-Mart also presented its own statistical analysis at 
a store-by-store level in which its expert found that there was no pay 
disparity in more than ninety percent of their Wal-Mart stores.13 Wal-
Mart also challenged the plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence as being limited 
to a very small percentage of their 34,000 stores across the country, and 
challenged the sociologist’s testimony as a mere conjecture. So evidence 
from both sides was presented to the District Court. 
The District Court in California certified the class for pay and promotion 
claims in 2003.14 Four years later it went up to the Ninth Circuit, 
which affirmed the class certification in substantial part.15 Three years 
later, it went to the full Ninth Circuit en banc. En banc, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed a substantial part the lower Court’s decision.16 They, however, 
did decertify one piece of the class action, which was remanded back to 
the District Court on the punitive damages issue. So that issue was not 
before the Supreme Court during yesterday’s oral arguments. 
9. Principle Brief for the Petitioner, 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Ca. 2004) (arguing that 
the size of the class exceeds the population of at least twelve of the fifty states)..
10. see Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 142 (N.D. Ca. 2004) 
(determining Title VII contains no special exemptions for large employers).
11. see Brief for Respondents, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 25411 
(2011) (noting that the under-selecction for women as Department Heads had merely a one 
in seven hundred chance of occurring randomly).
12. see Brief for Respondents, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 25411 
(2011) (describing senior officer’s practice of referring to female employees as “Janie Qs” 
and “girls” and of authorizing the holding of management meetings at Hooters restaurants).
13. see Brief for Respondent at 4, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 
(2011) (describing the assertion of Wal-Mart’s expert, Joan Haworth, that “more than 90% 
of the stores had no pay rate differences between men and women that were statistically 
significant”).
14. see Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (2004) (upholding the 
class certification as it satisfied the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy 
requirements).
15. see Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (determining 
that despite the size of the class, the class action could proceed in a manner both manageable 
and in accordance with due process requirements). 
16. see Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9h Cir. 2011) (upholding the 
district court’s class certification but determining the district court abused its discretion by 
certifying the plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims as a separate class for equitable relief).
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So the two issues before the U.S. Supreme Court are procedural. The 
first issue is whether the order certifying the class comports with Rule 
23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.17 And, the second [issue] 
is whether the claims for monetary relief can be certified under Rule 
23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, if so, under what 
circumstance?18
So our distinguished panel today will address these issues and the 
arguments before the Court. Most significantly, we will also discuss 
the potential impact of this decision not only in the employment 
discrimination area but also as it pertains to class actions. I hope to also 
address some of the pretty dramatic implications raised by several of the 
questions from the Justices during the oral argument. 
RICHARD UGELOW: I am going to talk in the most general terms 
in the five or six minutes that have been allocated to me to give some 
context to this litigation. 
First, I will talk about the background of Title VII, the potential 
impact of the Wal-mart decision, and the enforcement scheme set about 
by Title VII. So Wal-Mart, as you have heard, is an action to enforce 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.19 
What is Title VII? Title VII is the major Federal Civil Rights Act that 
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, religion, 
gender, color and national origin. It covers everything except age and 
disability, as there are other statutes that cover those specializations.20 
Lastly, it was the first major piece of anti-discrimination in employment 
legislation. 
So let me set the stage of what the employment situation in this 
country looked like prior to the enactment of Title VII in 1964. Up on 
the board, I do not know if you can see it, we had sex segregated jobs 
and we had race segregated jobs. I have put up here some examples of 
advertisements from either the Washington Post or the New York times. 
This one from 1964 shows separate job classified ads for men or for 
 
 
17. FeD r. civ. P. 23(A) (requiring that the size of the class makes joinder 
impracticable, there are questions of law or fact common to the class, the claims and 
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims and defenses of the class, 
and the representative parties “fairly and adequately” protect the interests of the class). 
18. FeD r. civ. P. 23(b)(2) (maintaining that the opposing party acted or refused to 
act on grounds applicable to the class as a whole, making injunctive relief applicable to the 
class as a whole)..
19. see The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (as amended) 
(proclaiming discrimination based upon race, color, sex, religion, and national origin to be 
illegal).
20. see The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 
(as amended) (prohibiting discrimination in employment because of physical and mental 
disability); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 
(as amended) (forbidding employment discrimination against anyone over the age of forty 
years of age).
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women.21 There were also separate job ads for whites and for “Negroes,” 
which blacks were called at that time. Most of the advertisements for 
women were for jobs like waitressing, nursing and teaching. The jobs for 
men often involved heavy labor. During this time in the United States, 
many states had statutes that prohibited women from lifting more than 
forty pounds and from working a certain number of hours in a week.
So it was a pretty ugly situation for women and the impact of this 
discrimination can be seen in the many professions. In an article in the 
New York times by Nicolas Kristof,22 he notes that many brilliant women 
became teachers in the early 1960’s because of discrimination in other 
fields. However, due to the progress that we have made as a society, more 
women are now becoming brain surgeons, lawyers, and accountants and 
have a whole range of job opportunities. The article also argues that the 
current shift by women to other professions, possibly due to low pay 
for teachers, has caused the teaching profession and our school system 
to suffer.23 While the current shift into other professions is voluntary, 
the overt discriminatory job segregation of the 1960’s still continues to 
affect our society. 
Where are we today? Well, what happened when Title VII was 
enacted? The statute did not magically heal the whole nation. There 
was no level playing field. What happened is that employers started 
adding other qualifications to the jobs. For example, if you wanted 
to be a security officer or a police officer you might have to be 5’7” 
tall. What does that mean? Well, it means that many women were 
disqualified from positions because they were not tall enough.24 Some 
employers also started imposing a college education requirement. Well, 
that disqualified minority groups from jobs because they did not have a 
college education or educational system at that time.25 
So we refer to these measures as facially neutral policies. They apply 
to everyone regardless of race or gender, but they had a more definitive 
impact on women or minorities depending on the job qualification that 
 
 
21. see William A. Darity Jr. and Patrick L. Mason, evidence on discrimination in 
employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. econ. PersPectives 63, 64 (1998) 
(structuring help-wanted advertisements so as to explicitly separate job opportunities based 
on gender).
22. see Nicholas D. Kristof. Pay teachers more, n.Y. times, March 13, 2011, at 
WK10 (citing a McKinsey & Co. study, saying that “these days, brilliant women become 
surgeons and investment bankers—and forty-seven percent of America’s kindergarten 
through twelfth grade teachers come from the bottom one- third of their college classes.”).
23. see id. (citing McKinsey study which found that teachers in countries such as 
South Korea, Singapore and Finland which are known for their educational performance 
are highly paid, are well respected and earn more on average than lawyers and engineers). 
24. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that Title VII prohibits the 
application of statutory height and weight requirements to disadvantage a protected class).
25. see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (determining that the 
higher education requirement was an articifical and unnecessary barrier to employment 
opportunities for minorities, violating Title VII).
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was imposed.26 So you could argue, as I would, that these initial job 
qualification facilitated continued discrimination by excluding women 
or minorities from certain jobs. 
So that, in a very thumbnail way, is the employment picture as of 1964. 
So then the question is, “How do you correct the bad policies from these 
decades of overt and what was lawful job discrimination?” Well, this 
can be done in two ways. A woman who was not 5’7” and wants to be a 
police officer in Philadelphia or Washington, D.C. can sue individually 
for a remedy. The other option is to get together as a group and file as a 
class to challenge the facially neutral practice that really has no bearing 
on one’s ability to perform the job. 
So I think you can see how objective it is to have class actions or 
group types of litigation lawsuits to challenge these facially neutral but 
yet discriminatory employment practices. That is the situation of the 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart plaintiffs. They allege that Wal-Mart’s employment 
practices has the effect of discriminating against them and denying them 
protected job benefits. 
Then the question is, “Who would enforce Title VII?” Well, Congress 
set up two methods in the Federal Government, more specifically, in 
the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission—both of which had litigating authority in 197227. So the 
EEOC had the individual cases of intentional discrimination, or what are 
known as challenges to patterns or practices of unlawful discrimination, 
like a height requirement [or] like a college education [requirement] for 
employment.
So these suits were brought in the name of the United States Attorney 
General—so it is the United States versus the defendant. Since the 
government has limited resources, Congress in Title VII said, “we 
should allow the private sector, the private attorneys, to enforce Title 
VII.”28 And these private attorneys became known as private attorneys 
general because they brought class action litigation and challenged the 
policies that discriminated against women or minorities.29 In the statute, 
Congress said, “private attorneys general who are successful can receive 
 
 
26. see id. at 429 (establishing disparate impact theory which states that practices 
while neutral on their face cannot be maintained if the operate to “freeze the status quo of 
prior discriminatory employment practices”).
27. Equal Employment Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2009) (establishing an 
investigative and judicial body that analyzes charges of discrimination against employers 
covered by the statute and occasionally files a lawsuit in furtherance of the individual’s 
interest).
28. see Overview, equal employment Opportunity Commission, http://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (establishing a procedure which allows 
either the Commission or a private to bring a suit on behalf of an employee, protected under 
federal law, who was discriminated against because of his/her membership in a protected 
class).
29. see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f), (g) (providing injunctions, appropriate affirmative 
action, equitable relief, back pay, and attorneys fees upon a finding that the respondent 
intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice).
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attorneys fees and be compensated for their work.” So there is a two-leg 
approach to enforcement: the federal government and private attorneys 
general. 
Wal-mart, depending on this decision, may knock out the private 
attorneys general enforcement leg. If you cannot bring class actions, you 
cannot [effect] systemic change and obtain attorneys fees. Consequently, 
attorneys are less likely to take on these cases. 
Now you can say that the federal government should handle all of 
these matters, but the federal government has limited resources to bring 
these suits. The federal government is not subject to class certification, 
 as the Department of Justice and Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission can bring cases on a self-starting basis.30 They are not 
affected by class action and if a pattern or practice of discrimination 
is identified by either agency, the Department of Justice or the EEOC 
could initiate the litigation. We would not be here talking if that class 
certification issue, if this case had been brought by a federal agency. We 
might be talking about something else like whether there is a pattern or 
practice of discrimination. But we would not be talking about the class 
certification issue. 
Finally, I would like to point out that the size of the class, the 
Government in the past, the Department of Justice in particular, has 
brought massive class actions under a pattern of practice claim. For 
example, every steel company in the United States has been sued by 
the Department of Justice—this consists of thousands upon thousands 
of cases.31 The entire major trucking industry has been sued by the 
Department of Justice—again with thousands and thousands of litigants. 
Both outcomes resulting in many millions of dollars in back pay.32 
So you ask, “well, how was this dealt with?” Well, the Supreme 
Court created a mechanism in the case of teamsters v united states 
for addressing these large class action or patterns or practices of 
discrimination.33 It is a two-stage process. Stage one is the determination 
of liability. Is the defendant, (the steel industry, the trucking company, and 
Wal-Mart) responsible? Did it violate Federal law? Did it discriminate? 
 
30. see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (empowering the Equal Opportunity Commission 
with the power “to prevent any person from engaging in nay unlawful employment practice 
as set forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title”).
31. see, e.g., Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Aff., Justice department settles 
allegations of Immigration-related employment discrimination against summit steel 
Fabricators in Houston , Justice.gov (Aug. 10, 2011) (reaching a settlement agreement 
to resolve allegations that the company engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination 
against non-citizens).
32. see, e.g., Clarification: Sexual Harassment - Truckers Story, seAttLe Press 
(April 11, 2012), available at http://www.seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2017960191_
apussexualharassmenttruckers.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (describing the suit brought 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of female workers who 
claim they were sexually harassed by mail trainers at an Iowa trucking company).
33. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977) (requiring the government 
to prove by a preponderance oof the evidence that the alleged discrimination was the 
company’s standard operating procedure).
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If so, stage two creates the mechanism to have individual hearings to 
determine individual liability. 
now that does not only include money—that is the issue at Wal-Mart 
but if you look at the trucking industry and the steel industry it was not 
only money but also seniority. It was length of service. This is as equally 
important to the employees as money. Perhaps we can talk about that 
later. There is also a mechanism for that.
LLEZLIE GREEN COLEMAN: So my role on this panel is to talk 
a little bit about class actions. I will talk about how plaintiffs approach 
it; and how a case becomes a class action. I will just mention that prior 
to coming to Washington College of Law, I was actually at Cohen 
Milstein Sellers and Toll and did minimal work on the Wal-Mart case. 
In an interesting aside, the case was actually filed and the class was 
certified when I first started at the firm in 2004. It hit the Ninth Circuit 
in December of 2004 and we are just now seeing an argument in the 
Supreme Court. So you can see how long this process takes. 
What are class actions? Class actions are cases where attorneys have 
discovered discrimination, usually through having individuals come 
to them complaining about individual discrimination. These attorneys 
continue to hear a very similar story from people all across the country. 
So it is not “oh, here is a company we think there is a problem that needs 
to be investigated.” These individuals are coming to attorneys and saying, 
“we are not being paid. We suspect that we are not being paid as much.” 
And in the case of Wal-Mart, women are not being paid as much as men. 
They are claiming that “[we are] not being paid as much as other men. 
[We are] not being promoted.” They are putting you in touch with other 
individuals who are basically saying that the same thing is happening 
across the board and you start investigating in real life and across the 
States and in every region where you are hearing the same types of 
stories. So that is the genesis for how class actions form. 
The idea behind the class action is that these cases can best be 
adjudicated by joining all of these claimants together.34 They are cohesive 
enough that the policy that they are challenging exists all across the 
company and all across the country. These stories are the same; you find 
statistically significant disparities in pay or promotions all across the 
country and as a result these cases could be adjudicated as one class. 
Thus, there is some judicial economy to addressing all of these issues 




34. see Why Class actions, Zimmerman Reed, www.zimmreed.com/Why-Class-
Actions/16076/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2012) (finding class actions allow individuals who 
experience a common injury to litigate their claim in an affordable and efficient manner, and 
as such, class actions serve as a deterent to businesses because it holds them accountable 
for committing multiple “minor” violations).
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case, millions of individuals for trial.35 So the idea is that they are bound 
together cohesively in a class and are challenging a pattern or practice 
that is occurring across the country or throughout that company. 
Class actions are governed by Rule of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which provides that the plaintiff has to meet a certain burden 
in order to establish that their class should be certified. In order for a 
class to be certified it has to meet all the elements of Rule 23(a). These 
elements include numerosity, which is that the idea that the class is so 
large that joinder of all of its members would be impractical. Clearly 
here no one is arguing that it would make more sense for 1.6 million 
people to litigate each claim separately, so individual litigation is clearly 
not feasible here. That really has not been contested, although it is also 
noted in terms of how class action functions. There is no magic number. 
So there is not, “oh, we have twenty people that can be a class or we 
have fifty people that can be a class.” Courts have issued a number 
of different opinions depending upon the particular circumstances in 
deciding whether a class is large enough to be certified. 
The second element is commonality and this provides that there must 
be questions of law or facts that are common to the class. This means 
that if you were to resolve these particular issues it would impact and 
resolve an issue that is similar or exists for all of the members of this 
adjudicated class.
The third element is typicality and that is the idea that claims of the 
named plaintiffs have to be typical of the claims of the class. So they 
cannot have some very unique claim that they are naming that would 
not be the same as all of the other individuals that are part of this class. 
The fourth element is an advocacy. This  requires the named plaintiffs 
to demonstrate that they and their counsel will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class. If you have a very small firm or 
individual, naturally they are going to have a problem in terms of 
adequacy of counsel. The court could actually determine that such a 
firm is not really in a position to represent the interests of this class of 1 
million women across the country. 
So in addition to those four elements of Rule 23(a), the Court also 
has to meet either 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). Rule 23(b)(2) is really just the 
issue here. Employee discrimination in class claims are usually certified 
under 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) basically says that “the party upheld in 
the class has to act or refuse to act on the grounds that are generally 
applicable to the class so that final injunctive relief and corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.” 
That is a relatively complicated way of saying that if you are looking 
for injunctive or declaratory relief that would resolve this issue, all the 
discrimination of women for the entire class or all of the individual 
members, you have to verify the class under 23(b)(2). What is important 
 
35. see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (the court is to consider whether “a class 
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controvery”).
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to note here when money becomes part of it, the concern is that if the 
plaintiffs are seeking various back pay and punitive disabilities, punitive 
damages are not certified.
Historically, being considered for equitable relief was based literally 
on the idea that but for this discrimination this individual would have 
been paid this amount of money.36 It is very different from compensatory 
damages that may be based upon somebody’s individual emotional 
response to discrimination. Compensatory damages typically involve 
individualized hearings and are typically certified under Rule 23(b)(3), 
which we will talk about in a moment. But there is another way for a 
class to be certified, but cases for monetary relief are typically certified 
under 23(b)(2). That is what has been challenged here today. In fact, 
that is one of the more disturbing aspects of Wal-Mart’s challenges. The 
company is arguing that the case should never be certified under Rule 
23(b)(2). 
23(b)(2) is also important because it is what we would call a 
mandatory class. If you are certified under 23(b)(2) then every person 
involved in the definition is part of this class. So the Court has decided 
it is cohesive enough that we do not have to basically distribute that 
notice to everyone who could possibly be a member and give them an 
opportunity to remove themselves from the class.
Rule 23(b)(3) is another way that a class can be certified.  It requires 
that the plaintiffs pay for distributing the class notification. One plaintiff 
must have the resources to send a notice to all of the individuals who 
would be part of the class and give them an opportunity to say that, 
“Well, my claim is special enough that I do not think that I should have 
to proceed with this class action. I can just do this separately.”37 So 23(b)
(2) also has other elements that the plaintiff has to meet in order for the 
class to be certified. They have to prove that the questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members. They also have to prove that the 
class action is a superior mechanism to the other available methods for 
the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 
Under 23(b)(3) you have to send out notice to allow the class members 
the opportunity to opt out and remove themselves from the case, but that 
is actually very costly. And I would maintain a loss technically is not 
an element that has to be proven under Rule 23. What you will see now 
is that our plaintiff also demonstrates manageability as an element of 
discovery. Mangeability is the idea is that in order to address the court’s 
concerns that this class action cannot be managed, you will not be able 
 
36. see gArY L. mcDoWeLL, eQuitY AnD the constitution: the suPreme 
court, eQuitAbLe reLieF, AnD PubLic PoLicY 9 (U. of Chicago Press, 1982) (comparing 
the traditional understanding of equitable relief which focused on specific concrete rights, 
especially property, with modern understanding of equitable relief which emphasized on 
broad remedial mandates exercised in a prescriptive way).
37. see Barbara J. Rothstein & Thomas E. Willging, Managing Class Action 
Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges 11 (2010) (using adequate notice as a possible factor 
in determining manageability factor of class certification)
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to figure out how to address all of these issues, and you will find that 
clients actually put forward a trial plan as part of their effort to get a case 
started. I think that that basically walks you through the element of class 
certification that you have a sense of what the plaintiffs are trying to do. 
CATHY VENTRELL-MONSEES: Great. Thank you. Larry?
LARRY LORBER: Thanks. Before we do anything, let me just add 
two, historical notes to Richard’s very appropriate historical setting, the 
first of which is relevant to this case. [W]hen the Civil Rights Act [of] 
1964 was passed, sex was not included within the civil rights package. 
Committee from Virginia to the employment section of Title VII as a 
means to defeat the bill because he thought that Congress would never 
pass a law barring sex discrimination—and it was.38 
Even more interesting is that the amendment was opposed by people 
such as Eleanor Roosevelt who was also afraid that the inclusion of sex 
inclusion would defeat the Civil Rights Act and also because the Equal 
Pay Act39 was passed the year before in 1963.40 So it was viewed, for 
whatever it was worth, that the law that would ensure equal treatment 
for women in the workplace. So there was that additional factor which 
sort of leads into my next point. 
I will just add one further thing. I also came from the Government. I 
was at the Labor Department and was involved with the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs, which is the Government agency that 
ensures that employers doing business with the federal government 
comply with laws and regulations that bar discrimination. When the 
Executive Order was issued, sex was forgotten.41 The order has since 
been amended to require affirmative action on the basis of sex.  42
In this opening session, I just want to talk about the case from the 
employer’s perspective. Let me begin by saying this. Sometimes bad 
facts make bad law. And for a lot of reasons, it can be said that the Wal-
Mart case for various reasons is not the only case to address these issues
.
38. see Carl M. Brauer, Women activists, southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition 
of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. s. hist. 37, 44-45 
(1983) (describing how Martha Wright Griffiths, who defended Representative Howard 
Smith’s amendment in the floor debate, recalled Smith explicitly teller her “the amendment 
was a joke”).
39.  Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006) (abolishing wage disparity 
based on sex); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq. (establishing 
minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping,and child employment standards affecting 
the private sectoras well as federal, state, and local governments).
40. see Brauer, supra note 38 at 41 (mentioning that Eleanor Roosevelt served as the 
chair of the President’s Commission on the Status of Women, which declared the equality 
of rights for women under the law was already embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments).
41. see Exec. Order No. 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (1967) (amending Executive 
Order 11246 to include the word “sex”)..
42. see id.
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now the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a limited question. It 
rejected most of the issues and the question to which cert was granted 
was on whether the class certification order under Rule 23(b)(2) was 
consistent with Rule 23(a).43 That is the only question before the Supreme 
Court. Notwithstanding this argument, they went far beyond it, including 
getting into the facts of the case. I think Justice Ginsberg appropriately 
pointed out this issue and Justice Sotomayor went on to say “Well, wait 
a second.” This is a low standard to get a class certification here. You 
don’t argue facts in class. You argue, as Llezlie said, that you meet the 
criteria of 23(a)—that is what you need to get a class. We will get to 
23(b) in a moment. In a trial like this would involve a lot of expert 
events both on statistics and sociologists and all the rest. 
So that was what was before the Court yesterday? I would add on 
that what happened yesterday, is that the Court meandered deeply into 
the facts of this case. Now, it is difficult not to do this in some respects 
because the issue is commonality. Was there a common practice or is the 
purported class related to each other in a manner sufficient so that they 
all could be considered to be in a class?
A secondary issue which came up which relates to 23(b)(2) as Llezlie 
pointed out, once you are in a 23(b)(2) class you cannot get out of a (b)
(2) class. If you are deemed to be part of it, you are in it. The Court is 
pondering whether or not if there was due process. Because you are 
talking about $11,100 [per person], give or take [a few dollars], . . . of 
back pay . . . times a million and a half, [t]hat is a lot of money. There 
is also interest on this amount depending on how far you go back, how 
long they worked there and so forth. So there are lots of computations 
involved. 
But once you are in a 23(b)(2) class you cannot get out of a 23(b)(2) 
class. [W]hat is happening here is that you are talking about everything 
in play at Wal-Mart since 2003 and 1998, but [this] still includes 544 
women who were managers [and thus,] who were both the victims 
and perpetrators of discrimination. [T]he argument presented was that 
Wal-Mart both delegated authority to its managers to the extent that it 
lost control over what the managers did, but that a policy of Wal-Mart 
[was] that women could not be appropriate managers at Wal-Mart.The 
other issue is that this class also included part-time employees as well 
as full time employees; so, arguably they would not have been eligible 
for a promotion in any case.  Additionally, the class included employees 
in every aspect of the Wal-Mart stores, including the meat cutters and 
the shelf stockers. 
From an employer’s point of view, when you are faced with this type 
of class assertion, one key element to begin with is to try to parse down 
the class so that you try to line up the purported class leaders with the 
 
 
43. see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 795 (2010) (granting certiorari 
to answer the question “Whether the class certification ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was 
consistent with Rule 23(a)”).
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purported class members. They have to be congruent with each other to 
some extent. They do not all have to be the same but to some extent they 
have to be lined up. Again, as Llezlie said, the class leaders have to be 
appropriate to the class. There have been cases where retired employees 
who were deemed not to be appropriate class leaders to the current 
employees in some class actions.
What Wal-Mart tried to do is to say: “We have 34,000 stores. We have 
fourteen regions. We have all different categories of employees—you 
cannot line up this massive group.” Again it is not because it is a million 
and a half; because of the diversity of the purported class. You cannot 
line up the class members with the class leaders and argue that  there 
was a common practice—that is issue one. 
Issue two, which is going to be very interesting in this case, is the 
role of statistics. The Supreme Court has accepted statistics and this 
is a pattern or practice case, not a disparate impact case for those of 
you taking it here.44 The Court addressed it as a pattern or practice case 
yesterday—otherwise you are run into a problem depending on what 
the District Court does on punitive damages. you cannot get punitive 
damages in a disparate impact case.45 In talking about a pattern or 
practice case, the question is the relevancy of the statistics. What an 
employer would do is argue that the statistics were not relevant to the 
argument of the class. They were not relevant in terms of, “Does it truly 
represent the components of the class?” So you have that issue which 
came up as well. 
Now let me just finish by noting that these are going to be critical 
issues. How the Court addresses these issues is going to be very 
important. I think that you have to parse this in a whole lot of ways 
because you have a chance for the employment laws to be rewritten in 
many aspects.
CATHY VENTRELL-MONSEES: Thank you. Fatima?
FATIMA GOSS GRAVES: Thanks to my colleagues for talking 
about some of the history of Title VII because I do think it is important 
to be in that context. I just wanted to clear up one thing that is true more 
than anything. Title VII, when passed, included language about sex, but 
the initial drafts and the ones that went to Committee did not constitute 
sex. Sex was added as a reason for some to kill the bill, although others 
were adding it with the hope that it would become law. In the end, it 
did become law. And so it has been there from the beginning although, 
how it has been applied in the Courts—particularly for women—has 
 
 
44. see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-430 (1971) (finding practices 
and procedures neutral on their face cannot be maintained if the operate to “freeze the 
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices”).
45. see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)-(b)(1) (limiting punitive damage awards to cases of 
intentional discrimination, that is cases that do not rely on disparate impact theory).
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ebbed and flowed over time. The class vehicle is especially important 
when you put it up against the equal where the sorts of classes that are 
permitted under Title VII are not equal. you could see how it could be 
more important. As my colleagues from the EEOC know, if this case 
goes wrong there is a lot hanging on this. 
The National Women’s Law Center submitted an amicus brief 
in this case and we did so because we wanted to be included in 
the record.46 I think at the argument yesterday and in some of the 
briefs there has been a lot of blurring over what facts are actually 
necessary at this stage. We are talking about the facts necessary to 
demonstrate that these women have essentially enough in common 
to proceed together. There are various arguments for how much they 
had to show; what the standard of proof should be. Some of these 
issues were never raised in argument but were thoroughly briefed 
There are just a couple of things that I want to highlight. I definitely 
thought that they would raise these points at the argument yesterday. 
The first is the information that was presented around the fiscal 
disparities both in pay and promotion. One of the questions that was 
asked at the argument was, “Essentially are these statistics enough?” 
47There is lots of other evidence in the case, but if you brought a case 
that said, “I can show that there is a policy that caused to women to 
be paid less, promoted less and when promoted having to wait longer 
for promotion, when you control for things such as job category, 
sonority, performance and evaluation. Those are the sorts of things that 
you would want a control for. If I can control all of those things and I 
show that women are paid less and promoted less despite having better 
performance value, is that sufficient to say that, “This common policy is 
impacting women in particular?” 
I don’t think there was a lot of time spent addressing this question. 
This may in part be because there is always other evidence in the case 
that the plaintiffs could put forward to try to show commonality. In 
our brief, we focused both on the statistical disparities and why these 
are important.48 We also focused on the other types of evidence since 
the claim is that “Wal-Mart has a policy of allowing its managers to 
 
 
46.  Brief for American Civil Liberties Union & National Women’s Law Center et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 
2541 (2011) (No. 10-277), 2001 WL 805231 (arguing that gender discrimination in the 
workplace, as alleged in the instant case, remains a national problem and class actions are 
an appropriate means of addressing this issue)..
47. see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (requiring 
plaintiffs to present evidence of “gross statistical disparities” to meet their burden of proof 
in a pattern or practice claim); see also Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 347-48 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (turning to “statistical significance” as the measuring rod in a pattern or practice 
case when gross statistic evidence is not available).
48. see Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and National 
Women’s Law Center, Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011) (noting that 
women working at Wal-Mart made 5% to 15% less than similarly situated men, even after 
accounting for seniority, turnover, and performance).
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exercise the excessive amount of discretion in making chain promotion 
decisions.” The plaintiffs brought in experts that tried to put it all 
together to explain that when there is this type of discretion it can allow 
managers to choose people for better pay and better promotions based 
on simply who they like and who likes them, rather than anything related 
to job performance. 
This is not a new theory. There have been lots of cases including 
Supreme Court cases that have dealt with this issue. If you look at some 
of the previous cases there is a little confusion over whether this is a 
new theory. And you know, one of the arguments is that it had to be an 
entirely subjective policy versus an expressive subjective policy. The 
idea [is] that there can be a policy of allowing managers to, basically, 
choose people who they like and [the company does] not give them 
enough guidance to ensure that [the managers] choose the person best 
for the job, [with its] promotions or pay. 
There was additional evidence presented that there were some sort 
of common stereotypes. There were 100 sworn statements from the 
women who talked about the types of things that were said to them by 
managers that fall into the categories of women [who] are not working 
for serious reasons, [arguing] that they are housewives, that they are 
not breadwinners, and that they do not really need the moneyhome with 
their children; do not need the promotion; and that it would entail travel. 
other comments by managers which I do not know exactly how it was 
put, but were more denigrating to women as workers with names like 
“Jennie Q” and “girls.” I honestly do not even know what “Jennie Q” 
means. 
At this point, the question is, “what do you need to show this sort of 
cohesiveness that Llezlie spoke about at the class stage?” There is a lot 
at stake. An immense amount of evidence is not available in many cases 
and that it sounds meritorious takes discussion and is necessary before 
you can even be certified. That is huge.
So I want to make sure I leave time for questions but I do not want to 
go on and on. And I do want to talk more about the argument yesterday. 
So I will stop here and let it go to Barbara.
BARBARA SLOAN: All right. I work for the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”) which is a federal agency.49 Thus, 
the views expressed on this panel are mine alone, and do not reflect the 
views of the EEOC or the Federal Governement. The EEOC is not part 
of the Department of Justice. It is also not part of the Department of 
Labor. We are supposed to be somewhat independent and not quite as 
political as the Department of Labor. As Professor Ugelow stated that 
 
49. see Overview, u.s. equal employment Opportunity Commission, http://www. 
eeoc.gov/eeoc/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (describing the EEOC’s role in enforcing 
federal laws which make it illegal to discriminate against an employee or job application 
because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, agem disability, or genetic 
information).
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“there are rising costs” to bringing these kind of cases, we are a little 
bit more even keeled as far as the kinds of cases we bring and the kinds 
of arguments we make. They are not quite as political in the tone of 
appeals as other agencies might be. 
We can sue, and like many Federal agencies we can bring our own 
suits that are EEOC versus the defendant. Under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act50 we can also sue state and local governments but 
in the private sector we are limited to Title VII and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.51 We only have litigation authority with respect to the 
private sector. So Wal-Mart would fall into our bailiwick and we have 
had quite a number of cases against Wal-Mart. I work in the Appellate 
Section so I litigate appeals in federal courts. I have worked on amicus 
briefs in cases against Wal-Mart as well as in one of our suits against 
Wal-Mart. 
Because the EEOC is part of the govenment, we are not bound by 
Rule 23. We can just sue. We do not have to show how they practice. 
We do not have to show that the claim is typical of the class. So the Wal-
Mart case impacts us to the extent that the Court does want to blur the 
merits and the class memberships—as this would directly impact our 
class litigation. 
The class issue will also impact us indirectly because we are teeny-tiny 
agency. We have I think about 250 lawyers nationwide. My Appellate 
unit has fifteen attorneys in total. One big case could require work by 
our entire section of the agency. So the extent that the Wal-Mart case 
adversely affects class actions would mean that suddenly we would 
have to be the main agency involved in these class action cases. 
We are confident that will not happen, and if it does, we had better get 
some more money and some more people, because we really do rely on 
private class actions for a large amount of the class enforcement. If the 
Supreme Court does hit on the merits issues, the main things that will 
affect us are if they decide on merit damages. That is something that will 
come up in our cases—the formula type of relief that claimants were 
arguing. This is the notion that we do not have to have many trials if we 
find out if Wal-Mart is liable. 
Specifically, when applied to the case at hand, [this] would mean 
that all of these 1.5 million people, or however many that they turn out 
to be, do not need to have a one-on-one mini trial with the Wal-Mart 
attorney and a Wal-Mart defendant. If we can determine the relief by 
looking at data from the databases we can compare it statistically with a 
comparable man and find out whether women were underpaid, overpaid 
or paid fairly. If they were underpaid, they would be entitled to a raise. 
We use formula relief in many of our settlements, so to the extent that 
the courts question about providing relief  would impact us. 
50. see Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2008).
51. see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2009).
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We would also be impacted by what Mr. Lorber said about statistics. 
We use statistics in our big cases. There seems to be some concern 
by  [the] Supreme Court about whether you can, in fact, challenge 
subjective employment practices—even though it has been forty years 
since people have challenged this notion. Additionally, there seems to 
be a question of whether subjectinve employment practices are limited 
to just 23(b)(2) class actions or generally. That would be something for 
the Court to decide.
CATHY VENTRELL-MONSEES: So we will say to you that we 
expect a decision probably the last week of June. It is probably going to 
be very mixed on a variety of basis. Susanna, I just want to thank [you] 
for organizing the panel. Have a great afternoon. Thank you.
END TRANSCRIPT
